T he hazard and operability, or HAZOP, study is a prime method for the identi cation of hazards on process plants. This is the rst in a series of papers which describes progress in the emulation of hazard identi cation in the style of HAZOP. The work reported is embodied in a computer aid for hazard identi cation, or HAZOP emulator, HAZID. The HAZID code is one of a suite of codes developed as part of the STOPHAZ project. The present paper gives an overview of HAZID, with an account of HAZOP and HAZOP emulation, and of the issues underlying it.
INTRODUCTION
The hazard and operability, or HAZOP, study is now well established as a prime method for the identi cation of hazards on process plants. It does, however, make considerable demands in time and effort on the engineering teams involved. It has therefore appeared attractive to try to develop computer codes for HAZOP. It is recognized that HAZOP activity is a creative task and developers of such codes have usually been wary of suggesting that their systems could replace HAZOP, preferring instead to indicate that they should be used as aids to, or in advance of, HAZOP.
Accounts of a number of such computer aids have been given in the literature, as described below. The present paper is the rst of a series which describes the creation of a computer aid for hazard identi cation, or HAZOP emulator, HAZID. The HAZID code is one of a suite of codes developed as part of the STOPHAZ project 1, 2, 3 . STOPHAZ was a major ESPRIT project, involving the collaboration of ten partners across Europe over a period of 3 years. The partners were: Aspentech (Belgium), Bureau Veritas (France), Hyprotech (Spain), ICI Engineering (UK), Intrasoft (Greece), Loughborough University (UK), SfK (UK), Snamprogetti (Italy), TXT (Italy) and VTT (Finland).
The present paper gives an overview of HAZID, with an account of HAZOP and HAZOP emulation, and of the issues underlying it. Other papers in this series describe the unit model system, the uid model system, the evaluation of consequences, several case studies used to evaluate and improve HAZID, and some topics for future developm ent of the tool.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
There are now available a large number of methods of hazard identi cation and techniques preliminary to hazard analysis. They include:
QUALITATIVE MODELLING
The most common approach taken by workers in computer-aiding of hazard identi cation has been to develop for typical process units, such as vessels and pumps, qualitative models of the in uence of one process variable on another. A plant description is then created which consists of a set of unit models, generally taken from a unit model library, together with the connectivities between the units. Using this plant description it is then possible to follow the propagation of faults through the plant. An early example of the use of such qualitative models was the work of Andow and Lees 27, 28 on the creation of an alarm data structure for a plant in support of real time alarm analysis.
The propagation of a fault through a plant may be represented in terms of the initiation of a fault in a unit which is unhealthy, the passage of the fault through units which are otherwise healthy and the termination of the fault in a unit which is thereby rendered unhealthy. The unit may be modelled by a set of functional, or propagation, equations, together with suitable fault initiations and terminations. A functional equation describes the relation between an output parameter of a unit and the input and other output parameters. A typical functional equation is L = f (Q 1 , 2 Q 2 ) which signi es that the level L increases if the inlet ow Q 1 increases or the outlet ow Q 2 decreases, and vice versa.
Andow and Lees used functional equations of this type to create a network in which the nodes represented the process variables and the arcs the in uences between the variables. They then 'combed' it to obtain a reduced network in which the nodes now represented those variables which were measured and could thus be provided with an alarm.
A graphical representation which is widely used in engineering is the directed graph, or digraph, also know as a signal ow graph. Accounts are given by Henley 32 . A digraph consists of a set of nodes joined by directed arcs. It is therefore a natural tool for the representation of fault propagation in process plants.
The use of digraphs has the advantage that there is a large body of associated theory covering such topics as their relation to algebraic and differential equations, equivalence between digraphs and so on. Digraphs have been used by Lambert 33 and others [34] [35] [36] [37] for the manual construction of fault trees. Lapp and Powers 38 used them in early work on computer-aided fault tree synthesis and have been followed by others. A brief overview of digraphs in this context has been given by Lees 6 . Qualitative modelling does have one drawback. In some situations it is subject to ambiguity, in the sense that it is indeterminate whether the in uence on a variable of some other variable(s) is positive or negative. This has been explored by Waters and Ponton 39 . The existence of this problem has not prevented the development of methods based on the qualitative modelling of fault propagation, but it is an area requiring further work. Some attempts have been made to tackle the problem of ambiguity using additional constraints and heuristics 40, 41 . Qualitative modelling, and its near synonym naṏve physics, is now a topic in its own right and there is a substantial literature 42 .
COMPUTER-AIDED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Some of the methods of hazard identi cation described appear to lend themselves to computer-aiding using techniques such as matrices, graph theory and qualitative modelling. The three methods which have been subject to the most active development are failure modes and effects analysis, fault tree synthesis and HAZOP. The rst two of these are described in this section and the third in the next section.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Fault Tree Synthesis
A semi-automatic method of failure modes and effects analysis was described by Taylor 43 in 1974 and this has been followed by a number of other studies [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] on computer-aiding of FMEA. At roughly the same time work began to appear on methods of fault tree synthesis. In 1973 Fussell 50 described a method of constructing fault trees for electrical systems by stringing together mini-fault trees.
The rst work on fault tree synthesis for process plants was the FTS code of Powers and Tompkins 51, 52 , further developed by Powers and Lapp [53] [54] [55] . These authors modelled the plant using digraphs. The fault tree is constructed by selecting the node for the top event of interest and then developing the causes of this event. The digraphs for the plant units were created manually.
Another early code for the synthesis of fault trees was CAT by Salem, Apostolakis and co-workers 56 -59 . In the CAT code the models used are cast in decision table form. The tree is then constructed by nominating a top event and developing its causes by selecting from the appropriate entries in the decision tables.
The RIKKE code of Taylor 60 utilizes so-called equation 'bigraphs', transition tables and mini-fault tree models. The construction of the tree proceeds by selecting a top event and developing its causes by tracing through the mini-trees.
The FAULTFINDER code developed from an extension of the work of Andow on alarm analysis by Martin-Solis, Andow and Lees 61, 62 , who introduced mini-fault trees in this application, and then applied this to fault tree synthesis also. In further work Kelly, Mullhi, Hunt, Lees, Rushton and co-workers 63 -75 extended the method to produce the FAULTFINDER code. The fault tree is constructed by selecting a top event and building up the tree from minifault trees. These mini-trees are generated automatically from functional equations of the type described above.
In addition to the codes mentioned, a number of other methods for fault tree synthesis have been described 76 -81 . The methods of computer-aiding which are based on fault propagation have a suf cient degree of commonality that it is possible to envisage a more generalized tool, able to support a variety of methods such as HAZOP emulation, failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree synthesis. A tool of this kind is the QUEEN code created by Chung 82 .
Model Generation
As the foregoing account brings out, the creation of the models of the plant units is a signi cant feature in a computer-assisted method. The gain from an automatic method is liable to be largely negated if it is necessary to create these models by hand. This is true whether the models are digraphs, decision tables, mini-fault trees or some other form. There is therefore some interest in automatic generation of the models themselves 83, 84 .
COMPUTER-ASSISTED HAZOP
Computer-aiding has also been applied to HAZOP and there are now a number of systems described in the literature. A detailed review has been made by Rushton 85 and a brief overview is given by Lees 6 .
HAZID (Original Version)
A method for the computer-aiding of hazard identi cation was described by Parmar and Lees [86] [87] [88] in 1987. This code, also entitled HAZID, was the forerunner of the HAZID system created in the present project. Parmar and Lees set out to develop a tool for hazard identi cation based on fault propagation, but did not originally assume that it would necessarily emulate HAZOP. They considered variants more akin to fault trees and to failure modes and effects analysis, but concluded that the HAZOP approach of examining every potential deviation in every line does offer the best assurance of completeness and therefore developed their initial version of HAZID as, in effect, a HAZOP emulator. The current version of HAZID retains this approach.
Many of the features of the present version of HAZID were foreshadowed in this earlier version. The plant is decomposed into units. The fault propagation through the units is modelled in terms of statements similar in form to Prolog clauses and the unit models are held in a unit model library. The creation of the unit models is performed through a model generation interface, the Prolog statements being generated automatically from functional, or propagation, equations. The output report is similar in form to that of a conventiona l HAZOP. This early version of HAZID was relatively primitive and lacked features such as a uid model and consequence evaluation. Further developm ent of HAZID has been described by Zerkani and Rushton 89, 90 .
HAZOPEX
HAZOPEX is a prototype expert system for hazard identi cation which is described by Heino, Karvonen, Suokas and co-workers [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] . HAZOPEX is a highly interactive tool. The plant topology is loaded at the start using a model editor. The user then examines the plant line by line.
The knowledge base in HAZOPEX is organized as a hierarchy of units, with classes and sub-classes, and with inheritance of characteristics. Search may be carried out at two levels. For a general search rules are classi ed by deviation type and for a lower level search by unit type. The level of search is controlled by the user.
One characteristic feature of HAZOPEX is that, whereas other systems use detailed models of the different units, it uses instead rather generalized tank and line models. Another feature is that the equipm ent models are complemented by a relatively well developed uid model.
Sets of rules are applied for causes, consequences and countermeasures. The number of rules used is: for causes, 330 rules; for consequences, 20 rules; and for countermeasures, 20 rules. Thus most of the rules relate to the causes. Less effort has been put into the consequences and countermeasures, which are more dependent on the speci c process.
Various types of display are used to show the output generated. One gives the results in tabular form, akin to the output from a conventional HAZOP study. Another shows a deviation at the centre with two trees attached, the causes tree being structured rather like a fault tree and the consequences tree like an event tree.
The project involved a process of continuous evaluation, which is regarded as having an important role in prototype developm ent. The authors describe work done to validate the program using an ammonia storage tank system and comparing the results obtained with those from a conventional HAZOP study. They also give an account of an application session.
HAZOPEX has been developed using an expert system shell running on a LISP machine. The ideas in the HAZOPEX system were developed further in the STARS and HAZOPTOOL projects 98, 99 .
Method of Weatherill and Cameron
A prototype system for hazard identi cation has been described by Weatherill and Cameron 100 . The code, which is highly interactive, is used to examine the system line by line. The user enters, for each line, the identi cation of the process units to which it is connected and of the ttings in the line. A deviation is treated as a goal, the existence of which the system attempts to prove by interrogating the knowledge base for possible causes. The knowledge base contains facts and rules structured around units rather than around the deviations. The program is written in Prolog.
COMHAZOP
The COMHAZOP system is described by Rootsaert and Harrington 101 . The plant con guration is entered and unit models are assigned to the units. The program examines deviations associated with the units and uses rules to identify the causes of these deviations.
HAZEXPERT
Gö ring and Schecker 102 describe the hazard identi cation system HAZEXPERT. This aid eschews a HAZOP-style approach. The plant con guration is entered. A set of prede ned consequences such as overpressure, explosion, etc., is used. A search limited in scope around the sets of units under examination is conducted to discover the causes of these events. The program contains a generic hazard knowledge base in which the key concept is the disturbance of the mass or energy balance. HAZEXPERT is implemented using an expert system shell.
PSAIS
PSAIS (Plant Safety AI System) is described by Schö nenburg 103 . The program utilizes only a limited number of rules but holds a large collection of design cases. Examination of a plant design is based on accessing 'similar' cases in the design case database. If no similar case is found, a new case is created. Use is made of fuzzy matching. In this way PSAIS bene ts from a continuous process of learning. A further account is given by Sanders 104 .
Method of Chae et al.
Chae et al. 105 describe an interactive system for the investigation of the causes and consequences of deviations of variables chosen by the user. There is a knowledge base of generic knowledge about process units and uids. The plant is decomposed into 'study nodes', producing a small number of 'vessels' and 'transport lines'. The examination is evidently limited to these study nodes; there does not appear to be any way to connect the process units together in the plant.
Method of Shimada et al.
Shimada et al. 106, 107 give an account of a system for the investigation of batch plants. The process knowledge base contains generic knowledge which describes the fault propagation in the equipm ent, or units, and speci c knowledge on the items of equipm ent in the plant, the connectivities between them, the uids present, the reactions occurring and certain attributes of the equipment.
Causal relationships between component failures and variable deviations are modelled using decision tables, with a separate decision table for each operational step of the batch process.
The program is an interactive one, in which the user speci es the equipment or line and the variable deviation and obtains the causes and consequences of the deviation.
HAZOPExpert
The HAZOPExpert system has been described by Venkatasubramanian, Vaidhyanathan and coworkers 108 -113 . The general approach appears broadly similar to that in HAZID.
HAZOPExpert utilizes G2 (marketed by Gensym), which provides an object-oriented shell for development of expert systems, particularly on-line process systems. G2 is supported by a strong graphical user interface. This is utilized in HAZOPExpert to allow the user to specify the piping and instrument diagram (P&ID).
The process knowledge base consists of both generic and speci c knowledge. The generic knowledge mainly comprises the unit models which describe the fault propagation in the equipment, or units. The speci c knowledge includes the items of equipment in the plant, the connectivities between them, the uids present and certain attributes of the equipment. The generation of potential hazards is enhanced by the use of a uid model.
The rst models for HAZOPExpert used a propagation equation approach, as did Parmar and Lees 87, 88 . In later accounts the models are based on a 'HAZOP digraph' (HDG). This is a form of signed directed graph which includes nodes which represent faults and consequences.
The ltering and evaluation of the scenarios generated is performed using quantitative information such as design speci cations and uid properties. This inform ation is used to make order-of-magnitude estimates of whether or not identi ed potential hazards are likely to occur.
In HAZOPExpert the normal mode of operation is interactive. A user initiates the 'HAZOP' of a variable by selecting it on the P&ID and assigning to it a deviation. The program performs a search and presents the results.
SOME ISSUES IN HAZOP EMULATION
The approach taken in HAZID, and the features provided, are better understood if there is an appreciation of the issues and problems which typically arise in developing a tool of this kind. Some of these issues are brie y discussed below.
Poor Initial Design
If the design submitted to the HAZOP, whether conventional or computer-aided, is poor, the large number of defects identi ed is liable to overload the process. It is highly desirable to ensure that a design does not go forward to HAZOP unless it meets a certain minimum standard. In the STOPHAZ project this was the motivation for the developm ent of ELDER, a computer tool for advising on aspects of an engineering line diagram.
Con guration Defects
A particular class of problem in plant design is that associated with the con guration of the units. There are certain con gurations which may be questioned, based on experience of problem s with similar con gurations, without resort to fault propagation. An example is the case of a control valve at the end of a long pipeline containing liquid. This con guration immediately suggests potential for water hammer. This type of situation can therefore be dealt with by a simple con guration rule.
Data Acquisition
A common problem in computer aids for process plant design is that of data acquisition. The value of the tool is greatly reduced or even negated if the data input overheads are excessive. It might be expected, since computer aided design (CAD) systems have been around for some time, that there should be little problem in downloading basic plant data, but in fact this is not the case. CAD systems are still fragmented and there is not a universal interface into which a computer aid of the kind described can be 'plugged'. The designer of such a system is therefore faced with the need to provide the interfaces necessary for the acquisition of the required data.
Plant description
Essential data are those given in the Engineering Line Diagram (ELD) of the plant, namely the constituent units, including the controls, and their connectivities. Equally essential are data on the properties, state and composition of the uids in the plant and the design envelope of the plant de ned in terms of pressure, temperature, etc. It is also necessary to have what may be termed 'con gurational' inform ation. For example, it is necessary to know whether a set of two pumps shown piped up in parallel is to be run as a set of two pumps operating in parallel or as a set with one normally operating and one on standby. Likewise, if there are two pressure relief valves in parallel it is necessary to know their duty and capacity.
Operating instructions
It is then necessary to create within the program a plant representation which is conform able with the method of analysis to be used. This also is not a trivial problem. For example, a plant is, or should be, designed to be operated in a particular way. The operating procedures therefore constitute a further set of information required for effective hazard identi cation. In the STOPHAZ project, this was the motivation for the developm ent of CHOPIN, which is a tool for capturing operational intent and to allow outline operating instructions to be produced ef ciently.
Unit models
In the methodology used, the individual units are each represented by a unit model. Each unit model is a set of qualitative relations equivalent to a signed directed graph. The formulation of high quality models requires some experience and effort. The provision of a unit model library is a partial solution, but experience shows that in most cases when constructing a new plant description it is necessary to con gure one or two new models. It is necessary therefore to provide some form of tool to assist the user in creating these models. The user can expect to nd in the unit model library the great majority of the models required. Guidance, however, should be provided to ensure a correct selection. This points to the need for a sound structure for the library.
Protections
HAZOP record sheets often have a column which indicates the protections available for the deviations examined. These protections are typically alarms, pressure relief devices, controls and trips. A computer-aided method is more complete if it can identify where such protections exist.
Search Ef ciency
Another issue is search ef ciency and program run time. Despite the power of current PCs, it is still necessary to try to limit the searches and to make them as economical as practical.
Output Record
With regard to the format of the output record, the intent within HAZID is that broadly this should follow that of a conventiona l HAZOP. It is characteristic of computergenerated searches that they tend to produce output which users do not nd 'natural'. The issue of casting the output in a form acceptable to users should be speci cally addressed.
Consequence evaluation
Another characteristic of computer-generated output in HAZOP emulations is that it tends to include an excessive number of unimportant consequences. In a conventional HAZOP these are ' ltered out', often almost unconsciously. Handling of the large number of 'false positives' is perhaps the single most signi cant problem in developing an acceptable tool. It is necessary to rank the consequences and to remove the less signi cant, though the user can be given some control over the threshold for reporting consequences. Even if a consequence is retained as signi cant, there can still be a problem with an excessive number of causes, most of which are unimportant. This again requires speci c treatment.
Completeness
Another aspect of quality in the output is completeness in identifying important consequences. Such completeness is largely a function of the quality of features such as the unit models and uid model.
Correctness
Finally, the output needs to be as free as possible of the outright errors and nonsenses to which computer-generated output tends to be prone. The only solution to this problem is high quality work throughout the system.
OVERVIEW OF HAZID
HAZID is intended as a computer aid for hazard identi cation. As mentioned previously, it is based on the code of the same name created by Parmar and Lees although it is very much more advanced. The intended application of HAZID is the screening of plant designs prior to their submission to a conventiona l HAZOP study. It is envisaged that, if the tool proves worthwhile in this application, it may gradually become more powerful.
The basic methodology is as follows. The plant is decomposed into a set of equipments, or units. The plant description consists essentially of models of these units and the connectivities between them and of a model of the uids in the plant.
The propagation of faults through the plant is described in terms of qualitative modelling. This is a technique of modelling which was used in early work on fault propagation in process plants by Lees, Andow and coworkers and which has been developed as a formal modelling technique with a considerable literature by de Kleer and other workers 42 . An important technique of qualitative modelling is the signed directed graph (SDG). This too is a formal method supported by an appreciable literature.
HAZID uses SDGs to qualitatively model individual equipment items. These SDGs are connected together at run time to form a large SDG model of the whole plant, which can be searched to nd links between possible faults and consequences.
HAZID Modules
The basic structure of the HAZID software is shown in Figure 1 . The software modules were developed by a number of member organisations in the STOPHAZ consortium :
· AutoHAZID was developed mostly by Loughborough University, with input from VTT to develop their uid rule system as a part of the program. AutoH AZID is the central module in the HAZID system, responsible for HAZOP emulation and presentation of identi ed hazards in the form of reports. It was developed in C++, starting from a simpler and more general program (QUEEN), written in Prolog 82 . A more detailed description of AutoHAZID is given in the next section. · The Graphical Tool (GT) and the Graphical Con guration Tool (not shown in Figure 1) were developed by TXT. The GT allows the user to prepare simpli ed engineering line diagrams as plant descriptions, for later submission to AutoHAZID for HAZOP examination. The Graphical Con guration Tool allows the visual icon used in the GT to be created and modi ed for any unit model de ned in the database. It also includes a bitmap editor for the icon used on the GT button bar. · Intrasoft were responsible for the design and implementation of the plant description database and associated Applications Programming Interface. These parts of the system allow the plant descriptions produced in the Graphical Tool to be stored and retrieved later by AutoHAZID. · The Unit Model Application Tool (not shown in Figure 1) was developed by Intrasoft, to allow the user to add new models to those recognized in the database. It allows de nition of the ports and the attributes belonging to the model. It is used, in conjunction with the Graphical Con guration Tool, to create and modify models to be used in the plant descriptions produced in the GT. · The Physical Properties Link (not shown in Figure 1 ) was developed by Aspentech and Hyprotech, with advice from Loughborough University. This interface allows various calculations of physical properties to be carried out in external software packages, using a common set of functions.
AutoHAZID Modules
The principal features of the AutoHAZID module are:
1. Decomposition of plant into process units. These sub-systems in turn draw on a unit model library and a uid model library, and the creation of unit models is supported by the model generation tool.
The con guration checker consists of a set of heuristic rules. It analyses the connectivity of the units within the plant model and warns the user of design aws. A driver routine is used to associate the rules with relevant HAZOP guidewords. The rules developed in this part of AutoHAZID are described in the following section.
The qualitative effects engine takes as input the plant model and the unit model library and generates an internal representation of the plant. It provides a set of procedures which can be called by other sub-systems to investigate how the plant will behave, given the deviation of a process variable, or to investigate the causes of a particular state of a variable.
The HAZOP emulation sub-system is the driving routine which mimics the HAZOP procedure by calling on the qualitative effects engine, con guration checker and uid model to perform the necessary inference. It also contains some ltering rules to enhance its output.
The unit model library contains unit models in the form of qualitative relations equivalent to signed directed graphs. The library is structured hierarchically to assist choice of models and to permit inheritance between models.
The model generation tool is provided to facilitate the creation of unit models. It permits the user to create a new model if the necessary model is not present in the library. It uses a question and answer session to construct a description of the structure of the new model, from which a model is created.
The uid library contains information on the physical properties of uids, such as boiling and freezing points and ammability and toxicity.
Con guration Rules
Certain problems in plant design can be identi ed from the con guration of equipment items on the plant, without resort to HAZOP. AutoHAZID runs a separate check for a small number of such con gurational features before starting HAZOP emulation and the results are blended into the main HAZOP report by associating each check with a guide word, such as 'maintenance', 'shutdown', etc.
The checks currently implemented in AutoHAZID, along with the associated guidewords used, are: offered by check valves. In particular, if one path between two major units is protected by a check valve and another is not, then there is a potential problem .
Scope of HAZOP
The user may sometimes wish to analyse part of the plant or to conduct a partial analysis of the whole plant. One case might be an examination prior to completing the detailed design. Another case might be an examination of susceptibility to overpressure. To meet this requirement, Auto-HAZID allows the user to set the scope of the HAZOP emulation by restricting the set of units, unit types and/or guide words to be considered. The user can restrict the scope of the analysis as follows:
1. Consider only/do not consider a particular set of plant items. 2. Consider only/do not consider particular types of plant item. 3. Consider only/do not consider a particular set of guide words.
Ordering of Units for HAZOP
In a conventional HAZOP the order of examination is not random . Lines are selected in a reasonably logical and sequential manner. A long line from a plant inlet through a parallel pump to a heating section is likely to be examined in two stages: rst, the line from the inlet to the pumps and second, the line from the pumps to the heating section. It is unlikely that the line sections would be examined in the reverse order. To be acceptable to the user, AutoHAZID needs to re ect this logical behaviour. On the other hand, different users may choose to order HAZOP in different ways. AutoHAZID should not prevent a user from selecting a preferred sequence.
AutoHAZID is capable of grouping equipment in the plant model into lines by nding paths for potential uid ow between plant inlets and outlets. The user is given the option of automatic or manual selection of the order in which the HAZOP is done. If automatic selection is chosen, AutoHAZID picks out the major units to be HAZOPed from each line and adds them to an ordered list. If manual selection is to be used, the user is presented with a list of units which are to be HAZOPed and is allowed to choose the order in which the HAZOP is to be conducted.
Input and HAZOP Processing
The normal mode of use for the HAZID package is as follows:
· The user prepares a plant description, either using the Graphical Tool, or in a text le. The plant description gives details of the equipment items in the plant and their connections, as well as the uids present. · The plant description is read into AutoHAZID and the program constructs a plant model, in the form of a large SDG, from the input data. · AutoHAZID also takes the data given on uids at this stage and infers the likely details of uids elsewhere in the plant by considering the stream connections between units. This process is called 'plant uid speci cation', and is designed to make the most use of the supplied information, so that data need only be supplied where they enter the plant or are changed. The data stored on uids consist of the pressure, temperature and ow rate, as well as a list of the chemical components present and a list of the mole fractions of those components. This inform ation is used by the uid model system to validate the feasibility of fault path scenarios produced by graph search. · When the plant description is read into AutoHAZID, the program compiles a lookup table for reporting the protections and preventive devices in the plant. This is used during the HAZOP emulation stage. · The user de nes the required scope of the HAZOP analysis and chooses appropriate ltering and output control options, as described in the next section. · When the user initiates HAZOP emulation, the program rst activates the con guration rule system, to detect design aws in the plant model. It then starts the HAZOP emulation process by examining each of the deviations within the scope of the HAZOP, in an order determined either automatically by AutoHAZID, or speci ed by the user. · The causes of each deviation are found by backwards search in the plant SDG, using a strategy which has been devised to minimize the amount of repeated search in this part of HAZOP emulation. The result of the search is a number of 'fault paths' linking initiating faults to deviations of interest, via a number of process variable deviations. · The feasibility of the fault paths may be tested by the uid model system at this stage, resulting in the rejection of a number of the fault paths as infeasible. · When the causes of the deviations have been found, each deviation is associated with the consequences in the plant SDG to which it is directly connected. This is a relatively trivial step and results in a number of complete fault paths, linking faults to consequences. The completed fault paths are further veri ed by the uid model system, so that some may be rejected at this stage as infeasible. · Information on any protections and/or preventive devices is added at this stage, by looking up the deviations seen in the table constructed when the plant description was loaded. · Results are reported in a text le using a HAZOP-style table with four columns, giving the 'deviation', 'cause', 'consequence' and 'protections' for each scenario.
Note that the HAZOP emulation algorithm only searches locally for consequences of a deviation, but searches for both local and distant causes of the deviation. This minimizes the search for consequences, but contrasts with the technique used in conventional HAZOP practice, where both local and distant consequences of a deviation are sought by the team.
Output Format and Filtering
AutoHAZID produces a HAZOP-style report table. It also has the ability to format the results as a structured text to serve as an export le for integration with HAZOP reporting tools. Also, at the report generation stage some reformatting and ltering is carried out to make the report more concise.
The fault propagation engine in AutoHAZID is exhaustive and generally produces a far larger result set than a conventiona l HAZOP does. Analysis of results from a conventiona l HAZOP suggests that the HAZOP team prune results which add no new information in three ways. First, a conventiona l HAZOP team tends to lump together similar units in a line. For example, the report may quote 'leaking valve in line from storage to reaction section' as a possible cause rather than quote each valve in the line. Second, a cause-consequence pair such as a leaking valve causing a toxic release may be identi ed under a number of different deviations, but a conventional HAZOP report will normally list the scenario only under the deviation where it was rst identi ed. Third, a conventiona l HAZOP report tends to include numerous references to earlier (or indeed later) deviations in the report as possible causes of the current deviation. Adding similar ltering methods to AutoHAZID makes for a more succinct and recognizable reporting style.
AutoHAZID therefore incorporates three lters. The rst lter, which gathers up multiple faults of a particular type in a line and combines them as a single fault of that type, is executed after the completion of the HAZOP emulation. For each deviation, the lter collects a list of faults found to be causes of the same consequence. If, within that list, more than one fault of the same type occurs, only the rst fault is listed in the report and it is post xed with the word 'etc.' to show that other similar faults have been ltered out.
The second lter, which removes repeated scenarios generated by different guide words, is also executed after completion of the HAZOP emulation. The list of results is scanned for repeated identical cause-consequence pairs, and only the rst instance of each pair is retained.
The third and nal lter deals with referencing of deviations as causes. Unit models include faults which give rise to deviations. For example, a pump model contains the deviation morePressure. Some deviations have a 'stopper ag' associated with them which is intended to halt propagation of a path towards a root cause, so that the deviation can be reported as a cause of some hazard. This is done primarily to produce more 'natural' reports but has the bene cial side-effect of restricting the length of paths generated by AutoHAZID. This lter is employed during the HAZOP emulation process.
Filtering as just described involves processes of consolidation and of stopping. It is to be distinguishe d from two other methods of modifying the output record: masking and consequence evaluation. Masking is the suppression of display of de ned categories of output. Consequence evaluation is the ranking of consequences according to severity, with the purpose of suppressing display of those below a certain level of severity. Therefore, the user has the following options for tailoring the results of the analysis:
1. Show only consequences above a certain severity ranking. 2. Show/do not show consequences of a deviation which has no identi ed causes. 3. Show/do not show causes of a deviation which has no identi ed consequences. 4. Remove/do not remove similar causes of a deviation. 5. Remove/do not remove duplicated scenarios identi ed under different deviations. 6. Show/do not show protections (associated with a reported scenario, i.e., a cause-consequence pair). 7. Show/do not show scenarios which have (associated) protections.
